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INTRODUCTION

Insurance law evolved significantly during the Survey year. The
issues addressed included commercial property and casualty insurers' duty to defend, the validity of exclusions in contribution actions, the definition of insurance, and the insurer's right to settle
within its insured's deductible. In addition, the courts addressed
several issues involving uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Finally, the legislature extended protection against arbitrary renewal and nonrenewal of policies to commercial property
and casualty insureds.

II.

THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY

A.

Coverage Issues

1. Triggering Coverage in Toxic Tort Litigation
Asbestos tort claims raise complex problems of coverage and obligations to defend under commercial general liability policies. In
Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries Inc.,' the Illinois
Supreme Court took the first steps toward clarifying these issues.
The Raymark court held that insurance coverage is triggered by
exposure to asbestos and by the manifestation of asbestos-related
disease or sickness. 2 The court held also that insurers have no obligation to defend new and existing claims once settlements or judgments exhaust policy limits.' Additionally, the court rejected pro
rata allocation of defense and indemnity costs when an asbestos
4
claim triggers more than one insurer's policy.
In Raymark, the Zurich Insurance Company ("Zurich") filed a
declaratory action to clarify its obligations and the obligations of
other primary insurers to Raymark Industries ("Raymark") for
the defense and indemnification of Raymark in thousands of underlying suits.5 These underlying suits involve personal injury or
wrongful death actions arising from exposure to asbestos contained
in products that Raymark manufactured from the 1940's through
the 1960's.6 Zurich and the other insurers provided liability insur1. 118 Ill. 2d 23, 514 N.E.2d 150 (1987).
2. Id. at 47, 514 N.E.2d at 161. For an explanation of exposure and manifestation,
see infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
3. Id. at 53, 56, 514 N.E.2d at 163, 165.
4. Id. at 57, 514 N.E.2d at 165.
5. Id. at 28, 32, 514 N.E.2d at 152, 154. Raymark is currently a defendant in over
thirty thousand lawsuits pending in state and federal courts across the United States. Id.
at 32, 514 N.E.2d at 154.
6. Id. at 32, 514 N.E.2d at 154.
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ance to Raymark throughout this period.7
In addressing when the duty to defend is triggered, the Illinois
Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that the coverage
provisions of the insurers' policies were virtually identical in their
provision for "bodily injury ... caused by an occurrence."' The
policies defined bodily injury as "bodily injury, sickness or disease." 9 The supreme court agreed also with the lower courts that
bodily injury, sickness, and disease are separate and distinct physical conditions. Each of these conditions alone might trigger coverage.10 Despite the common language, the litigants could not agree
when asbestos-related injury occurred ider the policies. " Zurich
advocated the "exposure" theory,' 2 the other insurers advocated
the "manifestation" 4theory,' 3 and Raymark urged adoption of the
"Keene" approach.'
Under the "exposure" theory, an insurer that provides coverage
at the time the claimant is initially exposed to asbestos will be obligated to defend and indemnify the insured.' 5 The "manifestation"
theory advoca.es contend that the manifestation of asbestos-related
illness by a claimant should trigger coverage.' 6 The "Keene" theory17 would require all insurers, from the date of exposure to the
7. Id. at 32-33, 514 N.E.2d at 154. Commercial Union Insurance Company insured
Raymark from May 1, 1941, through May 1, 1945, from February 4, 1947, through February 4, 1950, and from September 26, 1967, through October 15, 1969. The Federal
Insurance Company insured Raymark from September 26, 1951, through September 26,
1967. Zurich insured Raymark after October 15, 1969. Id.
8. Id. at 43, 514 N.E.2d at 159.
9. Id. at 44, 514 N.E.2d at 159.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 33-34, 514 N.E.2d at 154-55.
12. Id. at 33, 38, 514 N.E.2d at 154, 156-57.
13. Id. at 39-41, 514 N.E.2d 157-58. Federal Insurance Company argued that coverage is triggered by asbestos-related disease that manifests itself during the policy period.
Federal Insurance Company argued also, as did Commercial Union Insurance Company,
that the duty to defend is determined by the physical injury for which the plaintiff seeks
compensation. Coverage issues, therefore, should be determined on a case-by-case basis,
according to the injury outlined in the complaint. If a plaintiff's complaint seeks recovery for asbestos diseases only, then, according to this approach, insurance policies providing coverage at the time of "exposure" would not be triggered. Id.
14. Id. at 34, 514 N.E.2d at 155. For further explanation, see infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
15. Id. at 38, 514 N.E.2d at 156-57.
16. Id. at 39, 514 N.E.2d at 157.
17. Id. at 34, 514 N.E.2d at 155. This approach derives from the decision in Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1067 (1983). The Keene court determined that coverage is triggered at the time
of the claimant's initial exposure to asbestos and continues unabated until the manifestation of asbestos-related disease. Id.
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point of manifestation, to defend and indemnify the insured."8
In analyzing these arguments, the court relied on the medical
evidence in the record.19 The court determined that the medical
evidence provided ample support for the conclusion that "bodily
injury" occurs upon the inhalation of asbestos fibers. 20 The court
then defined "disease" as a condition "that impairs the performance of a vital function."'2' Based upon the medical evidence, the
court agreed that "disease" occurs in cases of asbestos-related illness when it is reasonably capable of medical diagnosis.22 The
court defined "sickness" as a "disordered, weakened or unsound
condition" and held this to occur at an unspecified point before

"disease. "23
Using this analysis, the court rejected all of the litigants' coverage theories.24 The court held that insurers with policies in force
when a claimant first was exposed to asbestos must defend
Raymark for the claim.25 Insurers that had policies in effect at the
time when a claimant alleged either sickness or manifestation of
the asbestos-related disease also must defend Raymark.26
After resolving the triggering issue, the supreme court considered the extent to which Raymark's insurers were obliged to defend when settlements and judgments had exhausted the policy
limits. 27 The court treated separately those policies providing coverage prior to September 26, 1967,28 and those policies providing
coverage after that date.29 The introductory sentence of the pre1967 policies provided that the policy coverage agreements are
18.
19.
20.

Raymark, 118 Il1. 2d at 42, 514 N.E.2d at 159.
Id. at 35-37, 514 N.E.2d at 155-56.
Id. at 45, 514 N.E.2d at 160.

21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.

Id. at 46, 514 N.E.2d at 160.
Id. at 47, 514 N.E.2d at 161.
Id.

25.
26.

Id.
Id. In its decision, the supreme court expressly rejected the "Keene" approach.

Raymark had urged that the manifest weight of the evidence indicated that bodily injury
occurs from the time of exposure until the manifestation of asbestos-related disease. The
supreme court disagreed, determining that the medical evidence was inconclusive regarding the progression of asbestos-related injury from the time of exposure until manifestation. Id.
27. Id. at 48-56, 514 N.E.2d at 161-65.
28. Id. at 48-53, 514 N.E.2d at 161-64. Commercial Union Insurance Company and
the Federal Insurance Company issued policies during this time period. Id. at 32-33, 514
N.E.2d at 154. For the dates each insurer provided coverage see supra note 7.
29. Id. at 53-56, 514 N.E.2d at 164-65. Commercial Union Insurance Company and
Zurich Insurance Company provided coverage after September 26, 1967. Id. at 32-33,
514 N.E.2d at 154. For the dates of coverage see supra note 7.
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"subject to the limits of liability . . . and other terms of the policy."30 The defense coverage portions of these policies provided:
"as is afforded by this policy, the company shall: (a) defend any

suit.., and the amounts so incurred, except settlements of claims
are payable by this company
in addition to the applicable limit of
''3
liability of this policy.

1

Raymark argued that the first sentence of these policies merely
confined the duty to defend to the type of coverage provided.32
Raymark further urged that the last phrase of the defense agreement controlled the insurer's duty to defend.33 According to
Raymark, the amounts incurred in defense of coverage claims are
payable "in addition to the applicable limit[s] of liability" and
without monetary limitation.34
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Raymark's arguments and

affirmed the appellate court's holding that the duty to defend does
not continue on new and existing claims once the policy limits have
been exhausted through judgments or settlements,35 In so holding,
the Raymark court agreed with the Georgia Supreme Court in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Meade Corp.,36 that "[t]o be insured
only as to type of coverage is no protection at all. Another dimension is involved, the amount of that coverage."' 37 The Raymark
court held that the first phrase of the pre-1967 policies limits the
duty to defend to the amount and to the type of indemnity coverage. 38 The court held that the provision in the defense agreement
30. Id. at 48, 514 N,E.2d at 161.
31. Id. at 49, 514 N.E.2d at 161.
32. Id. at 50-51, 514 N.E.2d at 162.
33. Id. at 49, 514 N.E.2d at 162.
34. Id. at 50, 514 N.E.2d at 162. In support of this interpretation of the duty to
defend, Raymark cited Conway v. Country Cas. Ins. Co., 92 Ill. 2d 388, 394, 442 N.E.2d
245, 247 (1982), for the proposition that the duty to defend is independent of the duty to
indemnify. As a result, Raymark contended there is no dependent relationship between
the amount of indemnity obligation and an insurer's defense obligation. Raymark, 118 I11.
2d at 52, 514 N.E.2d at 163.
Despite Raymark's reliance upon Conway, the decision was open to different interpretations. In Conway, the plaintiff's automobile liability insurer paid the policy limits to a
motorist with whom the plaintiff had collided. The insurer's payment was not made
pursuant to either a settlement agreement or judgment. Conway, 92 Il1. 2d at 391, 442
N.E.2d at 246. Although the Conway court stated that "an insurer's payment to its policy limits, without more, does not excuse it from its duty to defend," the court also noted
the issue might be decided differently when the insurer made "payment pursuant to a
judgment or a settlement agreement." Id. at 394-96, 442 N.E.2d at 247-48.
35. Raymark, 118 I11.
2d at 53, 514 N.E.2d at 163.
36. 219 Ga. 6, 9, 131 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1963).
37. Raymark, 118 II1. 2d at 51, 514 N.E.2d at 162-63 (quoting Liberty Mutual, 219
Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534) (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 51, 514 N.E.2d at 162.
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stating that the amounts incurred in defense "are payable in addition to the applicable limits of liability," is a clarification indicating
that defense costs shall not reduce the indemnity limits.3 9 Finally,
the court expressly rejected Raymark's interpretation of its insurers' duty to defend.1° The court ruled that although the duty to
defend is distinct from the duty to indemnify, they are not completely independent obligations.41 When the insurer might be
obliged to indemnify, the insurer has a duty to defend. When the
insurer has no potential
obligation to indemnify, the insurer has no
42
duty to defend.
In contrast to the pre-1967 policies, Zurich's post-1967 defense
agreements provided that "the company shall not be obligated...
to defend any suit after the applicable limit[s] of... liability [have]
been exhausted .... ,4 The court held that once Zurich's liability
limits are reached by judgments or settlements, it shall not be required to defend pending actions." The supreme court reasoned
that the post-1967 policy language is unambiguous insofar as it
states that the insurer is not obligated to defend "any" suit upon
exhaustion of the policy limits. 45 This, the court held, is an explicit
manifestation of "the parties' intention to limit Zurich's obligation
to defend all actions, including pending actions....
Finally, the Raymark court addressed whether the insurers
should assume their obligations pro rata when a claim triggers coverage under more than one insurer's policy. 47 The supreme court
refused to consider pro rata allocation according to each insurer's
period of coverage in relation to the total period of exposure.48
The court determined that pro rata allocation as adopted in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-EightInsulations, Inc.,4 is appropriate only in an exposure theory jurisdiction. 0 The court
indicated that although pro rata allocation may be appropriate
when exposure is the sole criteria for determining coverage, it may
39. Id. at 51, 514 N.E.2d at 163.
40. Id. at 52, 514 N.E.2d at 163.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 54, 514 N.E.2d at 164.
44. Id. at 56, 514 N.E.2d at 165.
45. Id. at 55-56, 514 N.E.2d at 165.
46. Id. at 56, 514 N.E.2d at 165.
47. Id. at 56-57, 514 N.E.2d at 165.
48. Id. at 57, 514 N.E.2d at 165.
49. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
50. Raymark, 118 I1. 2d at 57, 514 N.E.2d at 165.
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be unworkable when either exposure or manifestation may trigger
coverage. 5'
The Raymark opinion will have a significant impact on asbestosrelated insurance litigation. More importantly, the opinion will effect liability insurance litigation in general. With regard to asbestos-related litigation, the supreme court has clearly established
when asbestos related personal injury occurs,52 and rejected pro
rata allocation of indemnity limits. In determining that the duty to
defend terminates upon the exhaustion of indemnity limits, the
supreme court has clarified the scope of the duty. This delineation
of the insurer's duty to defend will have general application to all
insurance litigation.
2.

Professional Liability Insurance
During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District twice interpreted occurrence language in professional liability policies. In Harbor Insurance Co. v. Arthur Anderson &
Co.," the court held that under the prior notice provision of a
claims made policy,54 notice of a cause of action within the policy
period constitutes notice of all potential claims that may arise out
of the same facts alleged in the first cause of action.5 5 In St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Co. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp.,56 the court
determined that under a prior errors provision,5 7 an insurer may
not deny coverage when the passage of time has diminished the
foreseeability of a potential legal action arising from an insured's
prior error.5 8
In Arthur Anderson, several of Arthur Anderson's professional
51. Id.
52. Although the Raymark court stated that coverage will be triggered by exposure
and manifestation to asbestos, this decision may not foreclose continued litigation of
these issues. The gap between "exposure" and "manifestation" may lead to considerable
factual disputes. See Zulkey & Bauer, InsuranceLaw, 1985.86 Illinois Law Survey, 18
Loy. U. CM L.J. 605, 610 (1986).
53. 149 I1. App. 3d 235, 500 N.E.2d 707 (1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied, 113 Il. 2d
574, 505 N.E.2d 353 (1987).
54. A claims made policy provides liability coverage for claims that are made during
the policy period and for claims made after the policy period when notice has been provided to the insurer of either a claimant's intent to make a claim or of an occurrence that
may give rise to a claim. Id. at 237-38, 500 N.E.2d at 709.
55. Id. at 241, 500 N.E.2d at 711.
56. 155 Ill. App. 3d 545, 508 N.E,2d 433 (1st Dist. 1987).
57. Prior error provisions provide coverage to insureds for occurrences before the
commencement of the policy period when the insured has no knowledge of the prior error
giving rise to the occurrence and had no reasonable way to know of the prior error as of
the effective date of the policy. Id. at 549, 508 N.E.2d at 435.
58. Id. at 551, 508 N.E.2d at 436.
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liability insurers appealed a summary judgment order requiring
them to assume defense and indemnification obligations under
their 1971 policies in an action filed against the insured in 1975.59
These 1971 policies provided coverage for claims made after the
expiration of the policy period under limited circumstances.'
Coverage was available if, during the policy period, the insured
provided notice of either a claimant's intent to bring an action resulting from a covered occurrence or notice of an occurrence that
may give rise to a claim. 6 ' During the policy period, Arthur Anderson was sued by shareholders of King Resources Corporation
("KRC"), a corporation Arthur Anderson had audited.62 The
shareholders alleged that Arthur Anderson failed to disclose certain affiliations of KRC and transactions entered by KRC.63 This
failure to disclose allegedly resulted in an overstatement of KRC's
assets and profits and an understatement of its liabilities.6 Arthur
Anderson provided notice of this action to its excess insurers during the 1971 policy period.65 In 1975, Arthur Anderson was sued
for alleged auditing improprieties from the same 1971 period involving KRC and the same affiliates.66
The appellate court determined that although the dispute and
evidence in the 1975 action were not identical, they were significantly similar. 67 The court further determined that Arthur Anderson's 1971 notification of suit was also a notice of an occurrence
that might give rise to liability after the policy period. 68 Consequently, the court held that the insurers' policies covered the 1975
cause of action.69
The appellate court in St. PaulMercury Insurance Co. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp. also interpreted "occurrence" language in a
professional liability policy, but in the context of a prior errors provision. 70 In Statistical Tabulating Corp., St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company ("St. Paul") sought a declaratory judgment
regarding its obligation to defend Statistical Tabulating Corpora59. Arthur Anderson & Co., 149 Ill. App. 3d at 238-39, 500 N.E.2d at 709-10.
60. Id. at 237-38, 500 N.E.2d at 709.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 238, 500 N.E.2d at 709.
63. Id. at 239, 500 N.E.2d at 710.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 238, 500 N.E.2d at 709.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 240, 500 N.E.2d at 710.
68. Id. at 241, 500 N.E.2d at 711.
69. Id.
70. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 155 111. App. 3d at 547, 508 N.E.2d at 434.
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tion ("Statistical Tabulating") in an underlying action that alleged,
among other things, negligent rendering of professional services. 1
The professional liability policy was effective on January 1, 1983,
and contained a prior errors provision within its coverage. 2 The
provision provided coverage for occurrences before the policy's effective date if the insured did not have knowledge of the prior error
as of the policy's effective date, "nor any reasonable way to foresee
that a claim [for a prior error] may be brought....",7 In 1979 and
1980, Motive Parts Incorporated ("Motive Parts"), a Statistical
Tabulating customer, threatened to bring an action against Statistical Tabulating for the negligent performance of services.7 4 Approximately three years later, Motive Parts sent a letter to Statistical
Tabulating indicating its intent to sue Statistical Tabulating. Statistical Tabulating received the letter on January 3, 1983, and forwarded the letter to its new insurer, St. Paul.7 5 Thereafter, Motive
Parts filed its complaint against Statistical Tabulating. 6
The court determined that the 1979 and 1980 correspondence
between Statistical Tabulating and Motive Parts constituted notice
to Statistical Tabulating that prior errors had occurred. 7 Moreover, the court concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that
Statistical Tabulating faced imminent legal action as early as
1979.78 The court, however, concluded that the intervening period
from 1980 through 1983 may have diminished the foreseeability of
a potential legal action. 9 Consequently, the court held coverage
may be available under the prior errors provision.8 '
3.

Credit Disability Insurance

In Verbaere v. Life Investors Co. of America,8 ' the Appellate
Court for the First District considered an insurer's coverage obligations under a credit disability policy. The plaintiff in Verbaere
71. Id.
72. Id. at 549-50, 508 N.E.2d at 435-36.
73. Id. at 549, 508 N.E.2d at 435.
74. Id. at 548, 508 N.E.2d at 434-35. Statistical Tabulating provided data processing
services to Motive Parts during 1979. Motive Parts alleged that the services rendered by
Statistical Tabulating resulted in inaccurate billing to customers, Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 549, 508 N.E.2d at 435.
77. Id. at 551, 508 N.E.2d at 436.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The court remanded the case for a factual determination of this and other

issues. Id.
81.

157 Il1. App. 3d 676, 510 N.E.2d 946 (lst Dist. 1987).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

had secured credit disability coverage 82 from Life Investors Com83
pany of America ("Life Investors") to secure a motor home loan.
Thereafter, the plaintiff became disabled and Life Investors commenced monthly payments to his bank. 4 A few years later,
Verbaere sold his residence.85 To eliminate a mortgage on the
property, Verbaere entered into an agreement with his bank
whereby he would deposit the amount of remaining debt on the
motor home in an escrow account. 86 Thereafter, the bank seized
the money in escrow and paid the loan in full.8 7 Upon notice of the
bank's action, Life Investors cancelled the policy and returned the
unearned premium. 88
The beneficiary provision of the policy provided that the "proceeds ... are payable to the Creditor to the extent of its interest
and the balance, if any, shall be paid to the Obligor .. ."89 The
cancellation provision of the policy provided that cancellation
would occur "[i]f through prepayment.., or otherwise, the indebtedness... is discharged prior to its scheduled maturity date.... ."90
Life Investors contended that, upon discharge of the debt, the cancellation provision terminated its obligations under the policy.9 1
The court disagreed and held that the bank's payment of the insured debt after the insured's disability did not affect the insured's
right to continued benefits under the policy. 92 In reaching this
conclusion, the court cited dicta in Vogelsang v. Credit Life Insurance Co.,93 for the proposition that the commencement of disability
is the condition that must be met before liability attaches. 94 Im82.

Credit disability insurance "provide[s] indemnity for payments becoming due on

a specific loan or other credit transaction while the debtor is disabled as defined in the
policy." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 155.52(b) (1985).
83. Verbaere, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 510 N.E.2d at 947.

84. Id.
85.

Id.

86. Id. The escrow deposit served as collateral on the motor home loan as well as a
means of eliminating the mortgage. Id.

87. Id.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

678,
678,
678,
679,

510
510
510
510

N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d

at
at
at
at

947.
947-48.
947.
948.

92. Id.
93. 119 Ill. App. 2d 67, 255 N.E.2d 479 (3d Dist. 1970). In Vogelsang, the insured
became disabled and filed a claim with its insurer after the underlying debt was satisfied.
Although the court remanded the case for a factual determination regarding the diligence
of the insured's notice of claim, the court noted that "it is the onset ... of the disability
during [the policy] period ... which is the condition precedent upon which" liability
depends. The Vogelsang court stated that if this were the sole issue, it would have sum-

marily reversed in favor of the insured. Id. at 71, 255 N.E.2d at 482.
94.

Verbaere, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 679, 510 N.E.2d at 948.
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plicit in this reasoning, the Verbaere court held, is the conclusion
that satisfaction of the debt subsequent to disability does not absolve the insurer of liability under the policy. 95
Also in support of its holding, the court observed that upholding
Life Investor's interpretation of the policy would be inconsistent
with the overall construction of the policy and would render the
beneficiary provision meaningless. 96 In contrast, the court reasoned, construing the beneficiary provision to require continued
payment for disability would maintain the effectiveness of the cancellation provision in the event that the underlying debt had been
paid before any disability had occurred. 97 The Verbaere decision
establishes that disability is the insured condition in credit disability policies. The duration of indebtedness merely represents the
time frame in which liability may attach.
4. Reinsurance
The Appellate Court for the First District adjudicated a reinsurance coverage dispute in United Equitable Insurance Co. v. Reinsurance Co. of America Inc.98 In Reinsurance Co. of America,
United Equitable Insurance Company ("United Equitable")
sought an injunction and declaratory judgment regarding Reinsurance Company of America's ("RCA") obligations to indemnify
under a retrocessional agreement99 with United Equitable. 00 Prior
to the retrocessional agreement, United Equitable entered into a
reinsurance agreement' 0 1 with United Fire Insurance Company
("United Fire") whereby it assumed all of United Fire's liability
under its outstanding property and casualty policies. 102 United Eq95.

Id.

96. Id. at 680, 510 N.E.2d at 949.
97. Id.
98. 157 III. App. 3d 724, 510 N.E.2d 914 (lst Dist. 1987).
99. For a definition of a retrocessional agreement, see infra note 101.
100. Reinsurance Co. of America, 157 111. App. 3d at 728, 510 N.E.2d at 917.
101. A reinsurance agreement is
[a] contract whereby one party, the reinsurer, agrees to indemnify another, the
reinsured, either in whole or in part, against loss or disability which [the reinsured party] may sustain.., under a separate and original contract of insurance
with a third party, the insured.... A contract by which an insurance company,
in consideration of the transfer of the policies ... of an [insurer] which is insolvent or wishes to retire from business, assumes all or certain liabilities of the
latter [insurer].
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY

1082 (3d ed. 1969). A retrocessional agreement is, in

turn, the reinsurance of a reinsurance contract. The assuming party agrees to reinsure all
or a portion of the risk that the ceding party had already assumed in a prior reinsurance
transaction. Reinsurance Co. of America, 157 III. App. 3d at 726, 510 N.E.2d at 916.
102. Reinsurance Co. of America, 157 111. App. 3d at 726, 510 N.E.2d at 916.
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uitable entered into this reinsurance agreement based upon United
Fire's representations that RCA would, in turn, reinsure United
Equitable for all its liability under the original reinsurance agreement. 0 3 United Equitable received $100,000 from United Fire for
assuming the reinsurance obligation.' °4
Subsequently, United Equitable entered into the contemplated
retrocessional agreement with RCA and paid RCA $100,000.1'
The retrocessional agreement provided that United Equitable desired relief from "all liability emanating from any and all individual policy claims . . . as would be . . .paid by them under the
[underlying reinsurance agreement]."0 6 RCA agreed "to indemnify and reimburse . . .United Equitable . . .for all individual
policy claims [it] ...is obligated to pay. . . under the terms... of
[the underlying reinsurance agreement]."'' 0 7 The retrocessional
agreement also provided that liability would be limited to the
"claim amount that [United Fire's independent underwriting manager] had in force on individual ... policies." 08
RCA interpreted this last provision to require indemnification of

ten percent of the first $50,000 on any primary policy."'° RCA
reached this conclusion based upon United Fire's cession to other
reinsurers of all but ten percent of the first $50,000 of liability on
these policies.' 10 Therefore, when one of these reinsurers became
insolvent, RCA refused to pay those portions of liability attributable to the insolvent insurer."'
The Reinsurance Co. of America court disagreed with RCA and
103. Id. at 725-26, 510 N.E.2d at 915. These transactions were the result of a 1981
order issued by the New York Insurance Department which required United Fire to
cease underwriting property and casualty policies because of solvency concerns. United
Fire first attempted to cede its property and casualty policies to RCA directly, but the
New York regulators refused to allow the transaction because RCA was not licensed as a
primary property and casualty insurer. United Fire turned to United Equitable to solve
this problem. Id. at 725-26, 510 N.E.2d at 915-16.
104. Id. at 726, 510 N.E.2d at 916.
105. Id. at 727, 510 N.E.2d at 916.
106. Id. at 729, 510 N.E.2d at 917.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 729-30, 510 N.E.2d at 918.
109. Id. at 728, 510 N.E.2d at 917.
110. Id. at 727, 510 N.E.2d at 916-17. United Fire had contracted with an independent underwriting agency (Transcontinental Underwriters Agency) to manage the property and casualty policies on United Fire's behalf. The underwriting manager ceded all
but ten percent of the first $50,000 of liability on United Fire's behalf. Id. The court
noted that United Fire remained liable to the individual policy holders for one hundred
percent of the liability for which it had originally contracted. Id. at 730, 510 N.E.2d at
918.
111. Id. at 728, 510 N.E.2d at 917.
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affirmed the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of
United Equitable." 2 Because the court determined that the retrocessional agreement was not ambiguous,1 3 it relied upon the
agreement itself to determine liability.1 4 Based upon an analysis
of the agreement as a whole, the court held that the agreement
clearly required RCA to fully compensate United Equitable for all
claims that it would be obligated to pay on behalf of United Fire. 115
The court further held that the provisions relied upon to support
RCA's position could not be interpreted as a limitation on RCA's
liability.1 1 6 Reading the provision in light of the rest of the agreement, the court determined that the provision
merely described the
17
original liability of the primary insurer.'
Reinsurance Co. of America provides an addition to the small
body of reinsurance case law in Illinois. Based upon the reasoning
of the court, it appears that standard contract construction shall
prevail in reinsurance disputes. Absent ambiguity, reinsurance
contracts shall be construed by the textual provisions of the contract and without reference to extrinsic or parol evidence."'
B. Policy Exclusions in ContributionActions
The Illinois Appellate Courts had several occasions to consider
the application of policy exclusions in contribution actions.
Although the Illinois General Assembly enacted section 143.01 of
the insurance code"19 to invalidate certain motor vehicle policy
family exclusion clauses, the courts have refused to expand its
application.
The Appellate Court for the First District considered the application of policy exclusions in contribution actions in Allstate Insur112. Id. at 730-31, 510 N.E.2d at 918-19.
113. Id. at 729, 510 N.E.2d at 917.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 729-30, 510 N.E.2d at 917-18. The court noted the following characteristics of the agreement as dispositive of RCA's assumption of full liability: (1) payment of
identical premiums in both the reinsurance and retrocessional agreements; (2) expiration
of the retrocessional agreement upon payment of all the individual policy claims; and
(3) the recitation within the agreement of United Equitable's intention to be fully indemnified and RCA's willingness to fully indemnify. Id. at 729, 510 N.E.2d at 918.
116. Id. at 730, 510 N.E.2d at 918.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 730-31, 510 N.E.2d at 919.
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755.01(a) (1985). This section states: "A provision in a policy of vehicle insurance described in section 4 excluding coverage for bodily
injury to members of the family of the insured shall not be applicable when a third party
acquires a right of contribution against a member of the injured person's family." Id.
Section 143.01 was made effective on July 11, 1984. Id.
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ance Co. v. Boston Whaler, Inc. 120 In the underlying action, the
insured's son was injured while riding in his father's boat.12' The

insured's son filed a product's liability action against Boston
Whaler, the boat's manufacturer. 22 In turn, Boston Whaler
sought contribution from the father.

23

The father's insurer, All-

state, sought a declaratory judgment regarding its obligations
under a recreational package policy and a homeowner's policy.

24

Both policies contained clauses excluding coverage for "bodily injury . . . to any relative . . . residing in [the insured's] house-

hold."'' 21 In addition, both policies provided that if either policy
conflicted "with the statutes in [the insured's] state, the provisions
are amended to conform to those statutes."'' 21 On the basis of this
policy language, Boston Whaler contended that section 143.01
27
should be applied retroactively to the contribution action.

Moreover, Boston Whaler argued, the state law conformity clauses
amended the
policies to conform with section 143.01 upon its effec28
tive date.
The court rejected Boston Whaler's arguments and held that the
exclusion clauses were valid in contribution actions. 29 First, the
court held that section 143.01 should not be applied retroactively,
pursuant to the decision in Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Green. 30 The court rejected also the notion that state law con120. 157 Ill. App. 3d 785, 510 N.E.2d 1180 (1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied, 116 11. 2d
574, 515 N.E.2d 100 (1987).
121. Id. at 787, 510 N.E.2d at 1181.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 788, 510 N.E.2d at 1181.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 790, 510 N.E.2d at 1183.
130. 139 Ill. App. 3d 147, 487 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1985). In Green, a child was
injured when he was hit by a truck shortly after his mother had let him out of her automobile. When the child sued the truck driver, the truck driver sought contribution from
the mother. In refusing to retroactively apply section 143.01 to events that occurred in
1979, the court stated:
A reading of the amendment ... reveals that subsection (a)... does not provide

that it shall be applied retroactively. Moreover, at the time Green's policy was
issued, there was no statute prohibiting the family exclusion ....

Under these

circumstances, the retroactive application of section 143.01 to the insurance
contract would create a new financial obligation on the part of [the insurer]
expressly not agreed to, thus impairing its vested contractual right to exclude
coverage for family members.
Id. at 149, 487 N.E.2d at 102.
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formity clauses act as automatic policy amendment provisions.13'
Rather, the court held that these clauses simplify insurance policies
by informing the insured of the applicability of state law to the
policy without recounting all of the pertinent statutory and case
132
law in the policy.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Holeczy, 133 the Appellate
Court for the First District addressed whether a family exclusion
clause in a homeowner's policy is valid in a contribution action. In
the underlying action, the insured's son sustained an injury as a
result of a lawn mower accident. 34 In the ensuing products liabil135
ity action, the manufacturer sought contribution from the father.
State Farm, the father's insurer, sought a declaratory judgment regarding its obligation to defend the contribution action. 36 The
homeowner's policy contained a family exclusion and provided
coverage for property loss associated with motor vehicles "used''3to
service an insured's residence [and] not licensed for road use." 1
The insureds made several arguments in support of coverage.
First, they noted that the family exclusion applied only to "bodily
injury to an insured" and, thus, argued it did not apply to injuries
to a non-insured such as the manufacturer. 38 Second, they argued
that the family exclusion clause was invalid because the homeowner's policy was a policy of vehicle insurance as defined by section 143.01.' 39 Finally, the insureds contended that, although
section 143.01 applies only to vehicle insurance, the policy concerns underpinning the law should be applied to abrogate the exclusion in their homeowner's policy.14°
The Holeczy court rejected these arguments and held that the
family exclusion precluded the defense of the contribution action. 4' First, the court determined that whether the manufacturer
131. Boston Whaler, 157 111.App. 3d at 789-90, 510 N.E.2d at 1182-83.
132. Id.
133. 152 I11.
App. 3d 448, 504 N.E.2d 971 (ist Dist. 1987), cert. denied, 115 Ii. 2d
551, 511 N.E.2d 437 (1987).
134. Id. at 449, 504 N.E.2d at 972.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 451-52, 504 N.E.2d at 973.
138. Id. at 449-50, 504 N.E.2d at 972-73. The insured argued that, should the manufacturer be found liable in the first party action, it would be seeking compensation
through its contribution action for an economic loss. The insured urged the court to
consider this sort of economic loss as "property damage" within the meaning of the policy. Id. at 450, 504 N.E.2d at 973.
139. Id. at 451, 504 N.E.2d at 973.
140. Id. at 452, 504 N.E.2d at 974.
141. Id. at 451-53, 504 N.E.2d at 973-74.
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sought recovery from the insured for "bodily injury" or economic
loss was not significant.' 42 If the manufacturer's injury was personal, the exclusion clearly applied. If the manufacturer's injury
was financial, the manufacturer's potential loss in its suit with the
insured's child would be an intangible property loss that was
outside the scope of the policy's coverage. 43 Second, the court re-

fused to consider the homeowner's policy as a policy of vehicle
insurance as defined in section 143.01.'" The extremely limited
vehicle coverage provided by the policy was not considered sufficient to render the homeowner's policy a policy of vehicle insurance. 45 Third, the court refused to extend section 143.01 to
homeowner's policies.' 46 The court reasoned that if the legislature
intended a broader abrogation of the family exclusion, it would not
1 47 The
have expressly limited the legislation to vehicle insurance.
4
court, therefore, refused to invalidate the exclusion.
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Beautiful Signs, Inc.,1

the

Appellate Court for the Third District addressed the validity of a
commercial general liability "employee" exclusion in a contribution action. In that case, the underlying action involved an employee of Beautiful Signs who was fatally injured on a customer's
property. 50 The employee's estate sued the customer who, in turn,
sought contribution from Beautiful Signs.

51

Beautiful Sign's pol-

142. Id. at 451, 504 N.E.2d at 973.
143. Id. at 450-51, 504 N.E.2d at 973. Property damage was defined as "physical
injury to or destruction of tangible property". Id. The court cited Sentry Ins. Co. v. S &
L Home Heating Co., 91 111. App. 3d 687, 414 N.E.2d 1218 (1st Dist. 1980); and Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Case Foundation Co., 10 I11.App. 3d 1115, 294 N.E.2d 7
(1st Dist. 1973), for the proposition that economic losses as those sought to be compensated for in a contribution action are not "property damage" as defined in general liability
insurance policies. Holeczy, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 451, 504 N.E.2d at 973.
144. Holeczy, 152 111.App. 3d at 451-52, 504 N.E.2d at 973.
145. Id. at 452, 504 N.E.2d at 973.
146. Id. at 452, 504 N.E.2d at 974.
147. Id. at 452-53, 504 N.E.2d at 974. The court cited Country Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Jacobus, 601 F. Supp. 937 (C.D. III. 1985), in support of its holding. The Jacobus court
stated:
The Illinois courts had previously held that the household exclusion did apply
in the case of a motor vehicle contribution claim ... and it took an act of the
legislature to change that law. To hold that the household exclusion [under a
farmer's liability policy] does not apply to the contribution claim would be to
change the law ... [and that] is within the province of the legislature.
Id. at 941.
148. Holeczy, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 453, 504 N.E.2d at 974.
149. 146 Ill. App. 3d 434, 496 N.E.2d 1229 (3d Dist. 1986), cert. denied, - Ill. 2d -,
N.E.2d (1987).
150. Id. at 435, 496 N.E.2d at 1230.
151. Id.
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icy excluded coverage for "bodily injury to any employee

. . .

or

[for] any obligation of the insured to indemnify because of damages
arising out of such injury...., 5 2 Beautiful Signs argued that the
exclusion should not apply to the contribution action because a
contribution action is distinct from a direct action. 53 The defendant also argued that the indemnity exclusion applies
only to indem54
nification actions, not to contribution actions.
The court determined that the "employee" exclusion was valid
in contribution actions and, therefore, declined to address the indemnity argument advanced by Beautiful Signs. 55 The court held
that for the purposes of the liability policy, contribution is no different than a direct action.156 In support of this holding, the court
cited State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Suarez, 57 for the
proposition that the insured is liable for the injuries suffered by the
original plaintiff, even though the liability resulted from a contribution claim. 5" Moreover, the court noted that double coverage
was unnecessary because workers' compensation insurance covered
the employee's estate.5 9
In Midland Insurance Co. v. Bell Fuels, Inc.,16° the Appellate
Court for the First District dealt with a fact situation similar to
that in Beautiful Signs and reached the same conclusion.' 6' In the
underlying action in Bell Fuels, the Ford Motor Company
("Ford") sought contribution from Bell Fuels Incorporated62
("Bell") for damages that a Bell employee sought from Ford.
The Bell employee was injured while operating a Ford automobile
leased by Bell. 63 Bell tendered a defense of the contribution action
to its insurer, Midland Insurance Company ("Midland"). Midland, however, refused to assume the third party defense and
sought a declaratory judgment.t 64Midland contended that the action was not covered because an employee exclusion clause precluded coverage for "bodily injury to any employee ...
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 436, 496 N.E.2d at 1230.
Id.
Id. at 437, 496 N.E.2d at 1231.
Id. at 436, 496 N.E.2d at 1230.
104 I11.App. 3d 556, 432 N.E.2d 1204 (1st Dist. 1982).
Beautiful Signs, 146 II1.App. 3d at 436-37, 496 N.E.2d at 1231.
Id. at 436, 496 N.E.2d at 1230.
159 I11.App. 3d 780, 513 N.E.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1987).
Id. at 786, 513 N.E.2d at 4.
Id. at 781, 513 N.E.2d at 1-2.
Id. at 781, 513 N.E.2d at 1.

164. Id.

or any
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obligation to indemnify another" resulting from injury to any em-

ployee. 65 In response, Bell argued that the employee exclusion applied only to direct actions brought by an employee for bodily
injury and that the exclusion language barring "obligations to indemnify" a third party did not apply to contribution actions.,66
The Bell Fuels court rejected Bell's construction of the policy
exclusion. 67 The court held that the employee exclusion was valid
in contribution actions.168 In reaching this holding, the court
noted that although the contribution action is, in form, an action
for recovery of economic damages, Bell's liability was caused by
the bodily injury sustained by its employee.' 69 This exact type of
injury, the court held, was excluded by the policy. 70 The court
also dismissed Bell's attempt to distinguish between indemnity and
contribution.' 7' The court determined that the parties 72to the contract expected the exclusion to apply to contribution.
Bell Fuels, Beautiful Signs, and similar decisions exhibit a pronounced trend. 73 Absent either express statutory or contractual
language to the contrary, these decisions indicate that exclusion
clauses will be held valid in contribution actions. As a result, a
165. Id. at 782, 513 N.E.2d at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 786, 513 N.E.2d at 4.
168. Id. at 783, 513 N.E.2d at 2-3. The Bell Fuels court concurred with the findings
of the court in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Beautiful Signs, 146 Ill. App. 3d 434, 496
N.E.2d 1229 (3d Dist. 1986).
169. Bell Fuels, 159 Il1.App. 3d at 783, 513 N.E.2d at 3.
170. Id. at 784, 513 N.E.2d at 3.
171. Id. at 785, 513 N.E.2d at 4.
172. Id. The court distinguished Howalt v. Ohio Casualty Co., 142 IMI.
App. 3d 435,
491 N.E.2d 1207 (1st Dist. 1986). In Howalt, an injured employee brought an action
against a co-employee who, in turn, sought contribution from their employer. The employer's insurer refused to defend the employer because of a co-employee exclusion that
precluded coverage for any employee\ho caused injury to another "employee of the
same employer." The Howalt court held that this exclusion did not apply in contribution
actions despite the fact that the contribution action arose from an underlying claim for
bodily injury to a co-employee and workers' compensation insurance was available. Id.
at 441, 491 N.E.2d at 1211. The Bell Fuels court distinguished the Howalt decision because Bell Fuels' exclusion denied coverage for obligations to indemnify a third party
whereas the exclusion in Howait denied coverage for personal injury claims brought by
one employee against another employee. Bell Fuels, 159 Ill.
App. 3d at 786, 513 N.E.2d
at 4.
173. In a decision rendered shortly after the Survey period, the Appellate Court for
the First District continued this trend. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Giannini, 158 Ill.
App. 3d
657, 511 N.E.2d 755 (1st Dist. 1987). The Giannini court upheld the validity of an employee exclusion in a contribution action that arose out of a suit brought by a third party
defendant's employee. Id. at 661, 511 N.E.2d at 758-59. In so holding, the court cited
Bell Fuels with approval. Id. at 660-62, 511 N.E.2d at 757-58.
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decision such as Howalt v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. 174 may be
construed narrowly and confined to its particular facts.
C.

Contractual Time Limitations

During the Survey year, Illinois courts strictly construed policy
limitations and required insureds to bring suit against their insurers within contractually specified periods of time. Invariably, insureds who failed to comply with the contractual time limitations,
and the statutes that govern them, were denied coverage under the
policies.
In Wilson v. Indiana Insurance Co.,'7 a water pipe burst in Wilson's home while she was away. 176 Insulation absorbed the resulting moisture which caused decay in the structural supports of her
house. 177 Although the pipe burst in January, 1983, Wilson allegedly did not discover the loss until November, 1983, and did not
fil~e a proof of loss with her insurer until late January, 1984.178 The
Indiana Insurance Company ("Indiana Insurance") denied coverage on October 30, 1984, and Wilson filed an action to recover
under the policy. 7 9 Wilson's homeowner's policy provided that
"[n]o suit or action on this policy for ...any claim shall be sustainable... unless commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss."' 80
In upholding the trial court's dismissal of Wilson's complaint,
the Wilson court refused to consider the date of the "inception of
the loss" as commencing upon discovery of the loss by the insured. 18 ' Rather, the Wilson court expressly adopted the reasoning
of the court in Sager Glove Corp. v. Aetna Insurance Co. ,182 and
held that the contractually agreed upon time limitation barred Wil83
son's action.
174. 142 I1. App. 3d 435, 491 N.E.2d 1207. See supra note 172.
175. 150 111.App. 3d 669, 502 N.E.2d 69 (4th Dist. 1986), cert. denied, 114 Iii. 2d
559, 508 N.E.2d 737 (1987).
176. Id. at 670, 502 N.E.2d at 70.
177. Id.
178, Id. at 670-71, 502 N.E.2d at 70.
179, Id.
180. Id. at 671, 502 N.E.2d at 71.
181. Id. at 672, 502 N.E.2d at 71.
182. 317 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1963). In Sager, the plaintiff sought recovery for prop-

erty damage that had occurred more than twelve months prior to the filing of a suit for
recovery of insurance proceeds. The policy required the insured to bring an action within
twelve months of the inception of the loss. The plaintiff argued that the inception of the
loss was from the date of discovery of the loss. The Sager court held that "[t]he loss
occurs and has its inception whether or not the insured knows of it." Id.at 441.
183. Wilson, 150 Ill.
App. 3d at 672-73, 502 N.E.2d at 72.
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In Hartford Casualty Co. v. Snyders, 8 4 the Appellate Court for
the Fifth District considered what constitutes reasonably timely
notice of an occurrence that may give rise to liability under a medical malpractice policy. In Snyders, the underlying medical malpractice action was brought against Snyders and a drug
manufacturer on October 1, 198 1.1s In an earlier action that arose
out of the same set of facts, but named only the drug manufacturer,
Snyders was named as a respondent in discovery in May, 1981.186
Although Snyders' medical malpractice policy required Snyders to
"immediately forward to the company every demand notice, summons or other process received by him" and "written notice as
soon as practicable" regarding any occurrence reasonably likely to
involve coverage, the defendant did not notify his insurer, the
Hartford Casualty Company ("Hartford"), of any action or potential action until June 11, 1982.187 From March 23, 1982, through
June 5, 1982, the co-defendant drug manufacturer warned Snyders
of the possibility of a default judgment if he failed to respond to the
action. 18 As a result, Hartford sought a declaratory judgment regarding its duties to the defendant.
Hartford contended that Snyders had violated the notice provisions of his policies by providing late notice of the action pending
against him. 18 9 Snyders asserted that he was confused and did not
realize he was being sued.' 90 The trial court held that Hartford
had a duty to defend Snyders because the delayed notice did not
prejudice Hartford. The appellate court rejected the trial court's
holding and noted that the policy requirement of notice "as soon as
practicable" required reasonably timely notice. 19' The court further noted that regardless of an insured's status, it is "incumbent
upon him to seek clarification of his status."' 92 Based upon these
standards, the court held that a seven-to-thirteen-nonth delay in
providing notice was unreasonable and, under the circum184. 153 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 506 N.E.2d 627 (5th Dist. 1987), cert. denied, 116 III. 2d
554, 515 N.E.2d 108 (1987).
185. Id. at 1041, 506 N.E.2d at 628.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1041-42, 506 N.E.2d at 628. Snyders also had medical malpractice coverage from an additional insurer, the Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange ("ISMIE"). Snyders did not inform ISMIE of the suit until June 5, 1982. ISMIE sought a
declaratory judgment against Snyders and the trial court consolidated ISMIE's action
with Hartford's on May 26, 1983. Id.
188. Id. at 1041, 506 N.E.2d at 628.

189. Id.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 1043, 506 N.E.2d at 629.
Id. at 1042, 506 N.E.2d at 628.
Id. at 1043, 506 N.E.2d at 629.
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stances, 193 Snyders had no justification for the delay. 94
The Appellate Court for the Fourth District also construed contractual time limitations in the insurer's favor in Village of Lake in
the Hills v. Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co.195 In Village of Lake,
the Village of Lake in the Hills (the "Village") held a property
insurance policy with Illinois Emcasco Insurance Company ("Emcasco") that required the insured to give "immediate written notice" to the insurer of any loss. 196 The policy required the Village
to bring an action under the policy within one year after the loss
occurred.1 97 On June 7, 1980, lightning struck and damaged one of
the Village's facilities.' 98 In July, 1981, the Village gave written
notice of loss to Emcasco, and in August, 1981, Emcasco denied
the claim in writing. 99 The Village filed its original action against
Emcasco on December 12, 1981.
The Village of Lake court held that the contractual time limitation on bringing action under the policy barred the Village's
claim. 2 ° In so holding, the court rejected the Village's contention
that municipalities are exempt from contractual limitations on
their ability to bring a suit under an insurance policy. 20 ' The court
acknowledged that City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium,
Inc.202 upheld the common law governmental immunity from statutes of limitation. 20 3 The court, however, held the case inapplicable to the facts of Village of Lake because Village of Lake involved
neither a statute nor an ultra vires attempt to waive the common
law immunity from statutes of limitation.2 °
According to section 143.1 of the Illinois Insurance Code, contractual limitations on "the period within which the insured may
bring suit [under the contract are].., tolled from the date proof of
loss is filed... [as] required by the policy until the date the claim is
193. Id. The Snyders court noted the following circumstances: in twenty-five years of
practice, Snyders had dealt with attorneys; Snyders had provided depositions and statements to attorneys; Snyders had been served with a summons; and Snyders had received
phone calls from attorneys apprising him of his status in this particular case. Id.
194. Id.
195. 153 Il. App. 3d 815, 506 N.E.2d 681 (2d Dist. 1987), cert. denied, 116 I1. 2d
560, 515 N.E.2d 128 (1987).
196. Id. at 815, 506 N.E.2d at 682.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 819, 506 N.E.2d at 684.
Id. at 818, 506 N.E.2d at 684.
96 III. 2d 457, 451 N.E.2d 874 (1983).
Village of Lake in the Hills, 153 III. App. 3d at 818, 506 N.E.2d at 684.
Id.
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denied in whole or in part. ' 20 5 The Appellate Courts for the Second and Third Districts interpreted section 143.1 in Davis v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2 ° 6 and Kondourajian v. Millers National
Insurance Co.,207 respectively.
In Davis, a fire completely destroyed Davis' residence on March
26, 1983.208 Davis' homeowner's policy provided that "[n]o suit or
action may be brought [unless it is] brought within one year after
the loss. '' 2° 9 The policy further provided that "proof of loss [must
be] signed and sworn to by the insured. ' 20 Davis submitted the
proof of loss as required on May 24, 1983, and Allstate denied
Davis' claim on December 12, 1983, and returned Davis' proof of
loss. 21' On November 16, 1984, Davis filed an action to recover
under the policy. 212 Davis asserted that her insurer's denial of
claim was inadequate to recommence the running of the contractual time limitation. 1 3 The Davis court rejected this argument and
held that the inclusion of the insured's proof of loss did not obscure
the insurer's clear denial of claim.21 4 As a result, under the terms
of the policy and section 143.1, Davis' November 16, 1984, cause
of action was time barred.215
216
The court in Kondourajian v. Millers National Insurance Co.
similarly refused to interpret expansively section 143.1.217 In
Kondourajian, Kondourajian discovered that jewelry had been stolen from his store on December 12, 1983.2 8 Kondourajian's policy
required the insured to bring "suit . . . for ...recovery ... under
[the] policy ... within twelve (12) months . . . after discovery by
the insured of the occurrence [giving] rise to the claim. . . .,, 9
Kondourajian did not submit his signed and sworn proof of loss, as
required under the policy, until August 29, 1984.220 His insurer,
Millers National, denied the claim on November 8, 1984, and
205. ILL.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

REV. STAT.

ch. 73, para. 755.1 (1985).

147 Il. App. 3d 581, 498
151 Ill. App. 3d 870, 503
Davis, 147 Il1. App. 3d at
Id. at 583, 498 N.E.2d at
Id. at 584, 498 N.E.2d at
Id. at 582-83, 498 NE.2d
Id.at 582, 498 N.E.2d at
Id. at 583-84, 498 N.E.2d
Id.
Id.at 584, 498 N.E.2d at
151 Il1. App. 3d 870, 503
Id. at 872, 503 N.E.2d at
Id. at 871, 503 N.E.2d at
Id. at 871, 503 N.E.2d at
Id. at 871, 503 N.E.2d at

N.E.2d 246 (2d Dist. 1986).
N.E.2d 775 (3d Dist. 1987).
582, 498 N.E.2d at 247.
247.
248.
at 247.
247.
at 247-48.
248.
N.E.2d 775 (3d Dist. 1987).
777.
776.
777.
776.
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Kondourajian filed suit for recovery under the policy on June 28,
1985.221

The Kondourajian court held that Kondourajian's action was
time barred even after accounting for the tolling period mandated
by section 143. 1.222 The court determined that Kondourajian
should have brought his action by February 22, 1985.223 In so

holding, the court rejected the trial court's conclusion that the policy language merely required the commencement of a suit under
the policy within twelve
months following the insured's filing of
224
sworn proof of loss.

Wilson, Village of Lake, Davis, and Kondourajian indicate that
the courts will enforce clear contractual time limitations upon the
abili, of insureds to bring suits against their insurers. Contractual
limil itions are as fundamental a consideration for insureds and
their counsel as are statutes of limitation.
III.

OBTAINING AND CANCELLING COVERAGE

A. Retroactive Cancellation by the Insured
In Jadczak v. Modern Service Insurance Co., Inc.,225 the First
District considered whether cancellation by an insured may be ef-

fective retroactively. The plaintiffs in Jadczak were a permissive
user of, and passengers in, an automobile that Modern Service had
insured on behalf of the owner.226 The plaintiffs were involved in

an accident on February 7, 1982, with an uninsured motorist and
227
sought uninsured motorist benefits under the owner's policy.

The automobile in which they were riding was purchased three
days before the accident by the owner's husband. The owner had
obtained insurance coverage for the car from Modem Service at
221. Id.
222. Id. at 872, 503 N.E.2d at 777. For the statutory language regarding tolling, see
supra note 205 and accompanying text.
223. Kondourajian, 151 Il. App. 3d at 872, 503 N.E.2d at 777.
224. Id. at 871, 503 N.E.2d at 776.
225. 151 II!. App. 3d 589, 503 N.E.2d 794 (1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied, 115 Ii. 2d
541, 511 N.E.2d 429 (1987).
226. Id. at 592, 503 N.E.2d at 796. The court determined Jadczak was the permissive
user under the initial permission rule. This rule provides that if permission has been
given to the first permittee, further grants of permission to subsequent users do not have
to be shown. Jadczak sold the car to a purchaser who bought the car for his wife's
ownership. The purchaser returned the car to Jadczak for repairs on February 5, 1982,
the day after he had purchased it. The court determined that the purchaser had his wife's
permission to use the car and, thus, according to the initial permission rule, Jadczak had
permission to use the car. Id. at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 798.
227. Id. at 592, 503 N.E.2d at 796.
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the time of purchase.228 Three days after the accident, the owner
telephoned Modem Service and cancelled the policy effective February 5, 1982.229 The plaintiffs sought a declaration regarding
Modem Service's obligation to provide uninsured motorist coverage.2 a° In addition to contending that the vehicle was not "owned"
and the plaintiffs were not permissive users, Modem Service argued that the cancellation was effective as requested on February 5,
1982.231 Modem Service contended that because the insured requested the cancellation, the cancellation was effective.232
The Jadczak court held that the policy provided coverage to the
plaintiffs at the time of the accident and expressly rejected Modem
Service's cancellation argument. 23 3 Although the court recognized
that insurers and insureds may agree to cancellation, the court held
they may not do so after the loss has already occurred.234
B.

Life Insurance Cancellation

In Meehan v. TransamericaOccidentalLife Insurance Co.,235 the
Appellate Court for the Fourth District dealt with a unique cancellation issue. William Meehan, the plaintiff, had taken out several
life insurance policies on his life issued by Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company ("Transamerica"). 236 The primary
beneficiary under these policies was Meehan's wife, and the secondary beneficiaries were 'heir children.237 Meehan gave these policies to his wife and relinquished all his ownership rights under the
policies.238 After receipt of the policies, Meehan's wife paid the pol228.

Id.

229. Id. The purchaser testified that he urged his wife to cancel the policy. The
purchaser wanted the policy cancelled because he feared he would be bound to purchase
a destroyed automobile. Other testimony in the record indicated the purchaser feared he
might lose his house. Id.
230. Id. at 592-93, 503 N.E.2d at 796.
231. Id. at 593-95, 03 N.E.2d at 797-98.
232. Id. at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 798.
233. Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 798-99.
234. Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 798. In so holding, the Jadczak court distinguished
Copley v. Pekin Ins. Co, 111 Ill. 2d 76, 488 N.E.2d 1004 (1986). In Copley, the court
stated that "[g]enerally, contracts can be cancelled by mutual consent of the parties to the
contract." Copley, 111 111. 2d at 86, 488 N.E.2d at 1009 (citing Volk v. Kendall, 71 111.
App. 3d 211, 389 N.E.2d 697 (3d Dist. 1979)). The Jadczak court noted that in contrast
to the facts with which it was dealing, Copley involved a cancellation before the property
loss occurred. Jadczak, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 798.
235. 148 I1. App. 3d 477, 499 N.E.2d 602 (5th Dist. 1986).
236. Id. at 478, 499 N.E.2d at 603.

237. Id.
238.

Id.
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icy premiums.239 On December 17, 1980, Meehan's wife was convicted of attempting to murder Meehan. 2 ° After her conviction,
Meehan attempted to cancel the life insurance policies he had
given to his wife. Both Transamerica and the trial court refused to
comply with his request.241
On appeal, Meehan contended that cancellation should be allowed for public policy reasons.242 Meehan argued that allowing
someone to hold an insurance policy insuring a life that the policyholder has no interest in seeing continue would encourage illegal
activity.243 Moreover, Meehan contended that when continuation
of a life insurance policy endangers the very life it purports to in244
sure, the insured individual should be able to cancel the policy.
The Meehan court disagreed with these arguments and refused
to cancel the policies. 245 The court concluded there was no reason
to believe that, based upon a prior attempt on Meehan's life and
the existence of life insurance policies naming her as a beneficiary,
his wife would attempt to murder him again in the hope of collecting the insurance proceeds.246 The court noted that Meehan's contention that his life would be in danger in the future failed to take
into account the "rehabilitative value" of criminal conviction and
sentencing.247 The court also noted that the threat posed by his
wife while the policies remained in force is insignificant because the
law would prohibit recovery for any beneficiary who killed the insured. 248 The court determined also that various other policy concerns supported its refusal to allow cancellation by Meehan.249
The Meehan decision makes it difficult to conceive of a possible
fact situation where an insured who is not also a policy owner may
cancel a life insurance policy without the policy owner's consent.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 478-79, 499 N.E.2d at 603.
Id. at 479, 499 N.E.2d at 604.

243.
244.

Id.
Id.

245. Id. at 479-80, 499 N.E.2d at 604.
246. Id. at 480, 499 N.E.2d at 604.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.

249. Id. The court noted policy concerns including disruptive litigation of life insurance policies and similar instruments such as wills that would undermine their stability,
and the destruction of beneficiary rights of innocent third parties such as Meehan's children. Id.
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IV. INSURANCE DEFINED
The Appellate Court for the First District had the opportunity
to distinguish insurance contracts from service or warranty con-

tracts in Griffin Systems, Inc. v. Washburn.250 In Griffin Systems,
the Illinois Department of Insurance issued a cease and desist order against Griffin Systems for selling insurance in Illinois without
authorization. 21 Griffin Systems had been marketing "mechanical
service contracts" in Illinois since 1984.252 In exchange for money,
Griffin Systems would agree to repair or replace automobile parts
specified in the contract if they failed to function during the period
of the contract. 25 a The contracts contained exclusions and limitations as well as a twenty-five dollar deductible per part. 254 If a
covered part failed, the insured was required to file a claim with
Griffin Systems, who would refer it to outside adjustors for evaluation.255 Upon approval by the adjustors, a facility of the automobile owner's choice would repair the vehicle.256
Griffin Systems appealed the cease and desist order contending
that its contracts were service contracts and not insurance policies
over which the Insurance Department could exercise regulatory
authority.257 The Griffin Systems court disagreed and held that the
contracts were insurance contracts and that the cease and desist
order was valid.258 In support of its holding, the court devised a
four-prong test based upon the Illinois common law definition of
"insurance"
to determine whether a contract is an insurance policy. 259 These four prongs are: "(1) a contract . . . for a specific
period of time; (2) an insurable interest . . . possessed by the insured; (3) consideration in the form of a premium paid by the in250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

153 I1. App. 3d 113, 505 N.E.2d 1121 (1st Dist. 1987).
Id. at 114, 505 N.E.2d at 1122-23.
Id. at 115, 505 N.E.2d at 1123.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

257. Id.
258. Id. at 119, 505 N.E.2d at 1125.
259. Id. at 116-17, 505 N.E.2d at 1123-24. The Griffin Systems court relied upon two
decisions for the definition of insurance. Barnes v. People ex. reL Moloney, 168 Ill. 425,
48 N.E. 91 (1897); Continental Casualty Co. v. Fleming, 46 111. App. 2d 276, 197 N.E.2d
88 (4th Dist. 1964). The Griffin Systems court quoted Fleming, which described insurance as follows: "A contract of indemnity by which the insurer.. . undertakes to indemnify the insured against pecuniary loss arising from the destruction of, or injury to, the
insured's property ....
The essence of the contract is indemnity against loss." Griffin
Systems, 153 I1. App. 3d at 116, 505 N.E.2d at 1123 (quoting Fleming, 46 Il. App. 2d at
284, 197 N.E.2d at 92).
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sured to the insurer; and (4) the insurer agrees to indemnify the
insured for . . . pecuniary loss to the insured's property resulting
26
from . . specified perils."1 0
The court applied these four criteria to Griffin Systems' contracts and determined that they were insurance policies. 261 The
court noted that the contracts were issued for specific time periods,
had an insurable interest represented by the covered mechanical
parts, required payment of a premium, and obligated Griffin Systems to indemnify the insured for costs involved in the replacement
or repair of the covered parts. 262 The court considered additional
features of the contracts such as a twenty-five dollar deductible,
claims adjustment, and independent repair as indicative of their
insurance features.26 3 The court noted that service contracts or
warranties are distinct from insurance contracts . 2 The court explained that companies that manufacture or sell the product they
are agreeing to replace or repair issue warranties or service contracts.265 Griffin Systems neither sold nor manufactured the products that they promised to replace or repair.266 Griffin, therefore,
was not guaranteeing the performance of its own product. Instead,
Griffin sold indemnity agreements based on insurance principles.267
The Griffin Systems decision, therefore, is instructional because it
provides clear guidance in distinguishing insurance contracts from
warranty contracts.
V.

THE INSURER'S CONDUCT

A. Settlement Practices

During the Survey period, the Appellate Court for the First Dis260. Griffin Systems, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 116, 505 N.E.2d at 1123-24.
261. Id. at 116-17, 505 N.E.2d at 1124.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 118-19, 505 N.E.2d at 1125.
264. Id. at 117-18, 505 N.E.2d at 1124.
265. Id. at 118, 505 N.E.2d at 1124. The court cited GAF Corp. v. County School
Bd. of Wash. County, 699 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1980), Rayos v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 683
S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), and Guaranteed Warranty Corp., Inc. v. Humphrey,
23 Ariz. App. 327, 533 P.2d 87 (1975), in support of this proposition. Griffin Systems,
153 II!. App. 3d at 117, 505 N.E.2d at 1124.
266. Griffin Systems,, 153 111. App. 3d at 118, 505 N.E.2d at 1125.
267. Id. In so holding, the Griffin Systems court distinguished Vredenburgh v. Physicians Defense Co., 126 I11.App. 509 (1906). Vredenburgh involved an agreement whereby
an incorporated group of attorneys agreed to represent certain physicians in any medical
malpractice action brought against the physicians. The physicians paid an annual retainer fee for the service. Vredenburgh, 126 Ill. App. at 509-11. The Griffin Systems court
distinguished Vredenburgh because an attorney retainer arrangement does not involve
indemnity for losses. Griffin Systems, 153 I11. App. 3d at 118, 505 N.E.2d at 1125.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

trict determined whether insurers have an obligation to consider
the insured's interests when settling a claim within the policy deductible. In CasualtyInsurance Co. v. Town & Country Pre-School
Nursery, Inc.,26a the court held the insurer has no such duty.
The underlying action involved the injury of a child on Town
and Country's premises. 269 Town & Country's insurer, Casualty
Insurance, settled the resulting claim for $1,800, $200 under the
policy deductible amount.
In accordance with this deductible,
Casualty Insurance sought reimbursement from Town & Country
for the $1,800 expended in its behalf.27 I Town & Country refused
to pay, and Casualty Insurance filed suit for reimbursement of the
settlement amount.272 In its defense, Town & Country argued that
a settlement within the deductible falls outside the policy limits
like a settlement beyond the policy limits. 2 73 Consequently, Town
& Country contended that the insurer may not settle within the
deductible without considering the insured's interests. 74
The appellate court disagreed with Town & Country's contentions and determined that the policy language clearly gave the insurer the right to settle a claim within the deductible without the
insured's consent. 27 s The court held that, according to the policy
268. 147 Il1.App. 3d 567, 498 N.E.2d 1177 (1st Dist. 1986).
269. Id. at 568, 498 N.E.2d at 1177.
270. Id. The policy provided bodily injury coverage of $1,000,60 per occurrence
with a $2,000 deductible per claim. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 569, 498 N.E.2d at 1178. Town & Country sought to have the court apply
the Illinois rule that recognizes an insurer's duty to give its insured's interests at least
equal consideration to its own when, in the exercise of its contractual rights to settle on
behalf of the insured, the insurer consents to a settlement beyond the limits of the insured's policy. See e.g., Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 I1. App. 3d 472, 424 N.E.2d 645
(1st Dist. 1981); Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 69 111. App. 3d 196,
216 N.E.2d 198 (1st Dist. 1966).
274. Town & Country, 147 Il1. App. 3d at 569, 498 N.E.2d at 1178.
275. Id. at 569-70, 498 N.E.2d at 1178-79. The portions of the policy the court found
relevant provided: "the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against
the insured.., and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim as it deems
expedient." The deductible portion of the policy provided:
1. The company's obligation . . . to pay damages on behalf of the insured
applies only to the amount of damages in excess of any deductible amounts
stated in the schedule above as applicable to such coverages. ...
4. The terms of the policy, including those with respect to (a) the company's
right and duties with cespect to the defense of suits and (b) the insured's duties
in the event of the occurrence apply irrespective of the application of the deductible amount.
5. The company may pay any part or all of the deductible amount and, upon
notification of the action taken, the named insured shall promptly reimburse the
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language, this settlement right applies regardless of the deductible
amount. 2 6 In addition, the insured shall be liable to reimburse the
insurer for settlement payment by the insurer of any or all of the
deductible amount. 2 " The court held that the policy terms were
"clear and enforceable" and, absent allegations by the insured that
it was in an unequal bargaining position, the insurer could settle
any claim within the deductible regardless of the interests of the
insured. 278 In reaching this decision, the Town & Country court
has recognized that the insurer's duty to consider its insured's interests when settling beyond the policy limits has no application to
the insurer's right to settle within the policy limits.
B.

Subrogation

According to section 143b of the Illinois Insurance Code, when
an insurer recovers on a subrogated automobile collision claim, the
insurer must reimburse the insured a pro rata share of its deductible from the net recovery. The insurer, however, may deduct any
incurred expenses from this sum.279 In Morel v. Coronet Ins.
Co. ,280 the Illinois Supreme Court defined incurred expenses to include, in certain circumstances, attorney's fees paid to a law firm
28 1
on a retainer basis.
In Morel, the plaintiff damaged his vehicle in an automobile accident and sought coverage from his insurer, Coronet. 8 2 Coronet
company for such part of the deductible amount as i'-s been paid by the
company.
Id. at 570, 498 N.E.2d at 1178.
276. Id. at 569-70, 498 N.E.2d at 1178-79 (citing Orion Insurance Co. v. General
Electric Co., t29 Misc. 2d 466, 493 N.Y.S,2d 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); and Marginian v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 18 Ohio St. 3d 345, 481 N.E.2d 600 (1985)).
277. Town & Country, 147 Il1. App. 3d at 570, 498 N.E.2d at 1179.
278. Id.
279. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755b (1985). The statute provides in relevant part:
Any insurance carrier whose payment is reduced by a deductible amount under
...collision coverage is subrogated to its insured's entire collision loss claim
including the deductible amount . . . if the deductible amount has been . .
recovered by the insured it shall not be included in the subrogated loss claim
and ... the amount of loss pleaded. If the deductible amount is included in the
subrogated loss claim the insurance carrier shall pay the full pro rata deductible
share to its insured out of the net recovery on the subrogated claim. Administrative expenses of the insurance carrier cannot be deducted from the gross re-

covery, and only incurred expenses of the carrier, such as attorney's fees,
collection fees and adjuster's fees, may be deducted therefrom....
Id.
280. 117 Il. 2d 18, 509 N.E.2d 996 (1987).
281. Id. at 26-27, 509 N.E.2d at 1000.
282. Id. at 20, 509 N.E.2d at 997.
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paid for all but two hundred and fifty dollars of the plaintiff's damages. This amount represented the deductible portion of the plaintiff's collision coverage.28 3 Coronet then engaged a law firm with
which it had a retainer agreement 84 to exercise Coronet's subrogation rights against the motorist with whom the plaintiff collided. 285
The law firm recovered a sum from the other motorist in excess of
the deductible 286 and paid the plaintiff his pro rata share of the
deductible amount less the sum of $66.66 as alleged "incurred expenses" which Coronet attributed to "attorney fees. ' 28 7 The plaintiff brought an individual and class action against Coronet
contending that the law firm's relationship with Coronet was that
of "house counsel.1 28 Thus, the plaintiff contended, Coronet's annual retainer payments to the law firm were an administrative expense and not deductible from the insured's recovery according to
the terms of section 143b. 289 According to the plaintiff, the sum
deducted had no logical relationship to the time or effort expended
by the lawyers in pursuit of recovery against the other motorist. 290
The Illinois Supreme Court held that nothing inherent in the
retainer relationship indicated that the fees paid to the retained
firm were administrative as opposed to incurred expenses. 29' The
court defined "administrative expenses" as expenses of an insurer
that are general expenses constituting normal costs of doing business and unrelated to a specific claim. 292 "Incurred expenses," the
court stated, are an insurer's out-of-pocket expenses specifically associated with a claim.293 Accordingly, whether the insurer pays a
law firm case by case or with a retainer is unimportant so long as
the insurer can show that the sum deducted for an incurred ex283. Id.
284. Id. Under the retainer arrangement, the insurer paid an annual retainer fee to
the law firm. This fee was adjusted annually according to the number of cases the firm
handled. The firm did not bill on an hourly, contingent, or case-by-case basis. Id.
285. Id. at 20-21, 509 N.E.2d at 997.
286. Id. at 21, 509 N.E.2d at 997. The plaintiff's deductible was $250.00 and the
amount the insurer's firm recovered was $272.71. This amount constituted eighty percent of the total property damage Lhe insured suffered, Consequently, pursuant to section
143b, the insurer determined the insured was entitled to eighty percent of the $250.00
deductible amount (or $200.00). The insurer deducted the $66.66 from the $200.00 as
incurred expenses. Id.

287. Id.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

23, 509 N.E.2d at
21-22, 509 N.E.2d
23, 509 N.E.2d at
25-26, 509 N.E.2d
25, 509 N.E.2d at

998.
at 997-98.
998.
at 999-1000.
999.
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pense is specifically related to the individual insured's claim. 294
The court noted that an arbitrary figure chosen as a means to defray general legal expenses is not an incurred expense.29' Although
this decision clearly indicates that retainer arrangements may comprise "incurred expenses" within the meaning of section 143b, it
remains to be seen how insurers will meet the evidentiary burden
outlined by the supreme court.
VI.

UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

A. Settlement
On Januai-y 1, 1985, the Illinois Insurance Code was amended
by the addition of section 155a-2(7). 296 Section 155a-2(7) prohibits
insurers from exercising their subrogation rights under underinsured motorist coverage when the underinsured motorist has made
a settlement offer, unless the insurer advances the settlement
amount to its insured. 29 7 The statute addresses the "catch-22" in
which injured motorists found themselves when an underinsured
motorist made a settlement offer. 298 Typically, the injured motorist's insurer did not allow the insured to accept the offer because
acceptance by the insured would prejudice the insurer's subrogation rights. Nonetheless, the insured would not be entitled to underinsured motorist benefits until the insured settled with or
299
received a judgment against the underinsured motorist.
In Boyd v. Madison Mutual Insurance Co. , 3 the Illinois
Supreme Court determined whether section 155a-2(7) applies retroactively to policies issued before January 1, 1985.301 In Boyd, the
plaintiff, Boyd, sustained injury as a result of an accident with an
294. Id. at 26, 509 N.E.2d at 1000. Consistent with this finding, the court remanded
the case stating that the "insurer must ... establish ... that it paid its attorneys at least
$90.89 in connection with the plaintiff's claim under the fee kgreement." Id.
295. Id. at 26, 509 N.E.2d at 999.
296. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(7) (1985). This statute provides:
No insurer shall exercise any right of subrogation under a policy providing additional uninsured motorist coverage against an underinsured motorist where
the insurer has been provided with written notice in advance of a settlement
between its insured and the underinsured motorist and the insurer fails to advance a payment to the insured, in an amount equal to the tentative settlement,
within 30 days following receipt of such notice.

Id.
297. Id.
298.

Boyd v. Madison Mutual Ins. Co., 116 Il1. 2d 305, 309, 507 N.E.2d 855, 857

(1987).
299. Id.
300. 116 I1. 2d 305, 507 N.E.2d 855 (1987).
301. Id. at 309, 507 N.E.2d at 857.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

underinsured motorist on February 23, 1984.302 Boyd brought an
action against the underinsured motorist, and the underinsured
motorist's insurer offered the fifteen thousand dollar policy limits
in exchange for a release.3 a 3 Madison Mutual Insurance Company
("Madison Mutual"), Boyd's insurer, refused to accept the settlement offer and, as a result, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment in June of 1985. a°4 Although Boyd's policy was issued before
the effective date of section 155a-2(7), Boyd contended that the
new law should apply to the case. a0 5 In support of this argument,
Boyd argued that the statute was remedial in nature and procedural in effect and, thus, was to be applied retroactively. 0 6
The Illinois Supreme Court held that constitutional restrictions
prohibited the retroactive application of section 155a-2(7).3 °7 In so
holding, the court noted that laws that could impair pre-existing
contractual rights and obligations must be applied prospectively to
protect constitutional rights. 30 8 The court further noted that requiring insurers to match settlement offers by underinsured motorists under policies issued prior to the adoption of section 155a-2(7)
would create substantial, new, obligations for which the parties
had not bargained and would impair substantial pre-existing contract rights. 30 9 Thus, the court held that retrospective
application
31 0
of section 155a-2(7) would be unconstitutional.
B. Physical Contact as a Condition Precedent to Recovery
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. LeJeune 3 1' presented the
Illinois Supreme Court with another opportunity312 to refine the
parameters of the physical contact requirement for the recovery of
302. Id. at 307, 507 N.E.2d at 856.
303. Id. at 308, 507 N.E.2d at 856.
304. Boyd v. Madison Mutual Ins. Co., 146 Ill. App. 3d 420, 496 N.E,2d 255 (5th
Dist. 1986).
305. Boyd, 116 11. 2d at 308, 507 N.E.2d at 856.
306. Id, at 308-09, 507 N.E.2d at 856-57. See generally Maiter v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 82 Ill. 2d 373, 415 N.E.2d 1034 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 921 (1981); and
Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 11. 2d 342, 122 N.E.2d 342 (1954); but c.f Hogan v. Bleeker, 29
Ill. 2d 181, 193 N.E.2d 844 (1963) (procedural or remedial statutes are not applied retroactively when to do so would deprive one of vested property rights).
307. Boyd, 116 I1. 2d at 310, 507 N.E.2d at 857.
308. Id.

309. Id.
310. Id.
311. 114 I1. 2d 54, 499 N.E.2d 464 (1986).
312. See generally Lemke v. Kenilworth Ins. Co., 109 Ill. 2d 350, 487 N.E.2d 943
(1985); Finch v. Central Nat. Ins. Group, 59 11. 2d 123, 319 N.E.2d 468 (1974); and
Ferega v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 58 111. 2d 109, 317 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
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damages under uninsured motorist provisions. 13 In LeJeune, an
unidentified motorist struck a vehicle which struck the insured's
vehicle.3 14 The uninsured motorist portion of the insured's policy
provided coverage in the event an uninsured motor vehicle "hit"
the insured. 315 The insurer, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company ("Hartford"), sought a declaratory judgment that the insured
was not "hit" by the unidentified vehicle and, thus, uninsured motorist coverage was unavailable.316
The supreme court held that the physical contact requirement
for uninsured motorist coverage is met when an unidentified vehicle strikes another vehicle forcing that vehicle into contact with the
insured's vehicle. 31 7 The supreme court noted that Illinois law 3t"
considers the physical contact rule satisfied when a direct and contemporaneous causal connection exists between the insured vehicle
and the unidentified vehicle.31 9 When the direct causal connection
exists, the policy concerns underlying the physical contact rule are
met. 32° The court, however, concluded that to satisfy the physical
contact rule's policy concerns, the actual occurrence of the hit
must be proved. 32' Accordingly, the court remanded the case for
further proceedings.322
313. Lejeune, 114 111. 2d at 56, 499 N.E.2d at 465.
314. Id. at 56, 499 N.E.2d at 464.
315. Id. at 56, 499 N.E.2d at 465.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 59, 499 N.E.2d at 466. In so holding, the court noted that the majority of
those jurisdictions that had considered this issue reached similar conclusions. Id. at 5758, 499 N.E.2d at 465. The court cited State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Spinola, 374
F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1967); Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 47
Cal. Rptr. 832 (1965); Springer v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 22 Mich. App. 669
(1970); Spaulding v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 95, 202 S.E.2d 653 (1974);
Latham v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 482 S.W. 2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972);
and Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Wash. 2d 587, 424 P.2d 648 (1967).
Lejeune, 114 Iil. 2d at 57-58, 499 N.E. 2d at 465.
318. Lejeune, 114 I11.
2d a' 57-58, 499 N.E.2d at 465. The court cited Illinois National Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 116 I11.
App. 3d 1067, 452 N.E.2d 707 (1st Dist. 1983). In
Palmer, the court held that the insured's uninsured moto,bt coverage encompassed damage resulting from a lug nut that flew off an unidentified vehicle. In such circumstances,
the Palmer court held, the physical contact requirement is met. Palmer, 116 III. App. 3d
at 1068-69, 452 N.E.2d at 708.
319. LeJeune, 114 I11.
2d at 59, 499 N.E.2d at 466. Again the LeJeune court cited
Illinois National Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 116 I11.
App. 3d 1067, 452 N.E.2d 707 (1st Dist.
1983). According to Palmer, the physical contact rule is intended to reduce the chance
that insureds will make fraudulent uninsured motorist claims by claiming damage was
caused by a hit-and-run vehicle when, in fact, the accident was the result of the insured's
own error. Palmer, 116 Ill.
App. 3d at 1069, 452 N.E.2d at 708.
320. LeJeune, 114 111.2d at 59, 499 N.E.2d at 466.
321. Id.
322. Id. In a concurring opinion Justice Ryan noted that the policy language used by
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The Owned Vehicle Exclusion

On July 1, 1983, section 143a-2(5) of the Illinois Insurance Code

became law. That section requires automobile liability insurers to
provide underinsured motorist benefits in an amount equal to uninsured motorist benefits.323 In Hettenhausen v. Economy Fire &
Casualty Co.. 24 the Appellate Court for the First District became
the first court of review to interpret section 155a-2(5) as applied to
an owned vehicle exclusion to underinsured motorist coverage. 25
In Hettenhausen, the plaintiff's decedent died in an accident
with an underinsured motorist.326 The decedent had underinsured
motorist coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence with an exclusion for injury sustained while occupying a ve327
hicle owned by the insured, but not insured under the policy.
Economy Fire and Casualty Company ("Economy") denied underinsured motorist coverage because the insured's policy did not
cover the motorc-cle that the insured was driving. 328 Economy argued that the punlic policy considerations that void "owned vehicle" exclusions regarding uninsured motorist coverage do not
apply to underinsured motorist coverage.3 29 Nonetheless, the trial
the insurer in Boyd was distinct from typical uninsured motorist policy language which
merely requires "physical contact." Justice Ryan then cautioned that attempts by insurers to draft policy language denying uninsured motorist coverage in the event of indirect
physical contact as in Boyd would be void as against public policy. Id. at 59-61, 499
N.E.2d at 466-67.
323. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(5) (1985). This statute provides:
On or after July 1, 1983, no policy insuring against loss resulting from liability
...for bodily injury or death ... arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle shall be renewed or delivered or issued . . . unless underinsured motorist coverage is included in such policy in an amount at least equal
to the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided in that policy
where such uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the limits set forth in Section
7-203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

Id.
324. 154 Ill. App. 3d 488, 507 N.E.2d 121 (1st Dist. 1987).
325. Id. at 492, 507 N.E.2d at 124.
326. Id. at 490, 507 N.E.2d at 122. The underinsured motorist had an automobile
policy with limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 490, 507 N.E.2d at 123.
329. Id. at 491, 507 N.E.2d at 123. The Hettenhausen court quoted the policy concerns as stated in Squire v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167, 370 N.E.2d 1044
(1977) as follows: "[T]he purpose of [the statute mandating uninsured motorist coverage]
is to place the policyholder in substantially the same position he would occupy, so far as
his being injured or killed is concerned, if the wrongful driver had ... minimum liability
insurance [coverage]." Hettenhausen, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 491, 507 N.E.2d at 124. The
Squire court held the owned vehicle exclusion invalid as to uninsured motorist coverage.
Squire, 69 Ill. 2d at 179, 370 N.E.2d at 1049.
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court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.3
The appellate court determined that the public policy concerns
underpinning uninsured motorist coverage are similar to the policy
concerns underpinning underinsured motorist coverage. 331 As in
the context of uninsured motorist coverage, allowance of the exclusion would thwart the legislative purpose of mandatory underinsured motorist benefits. 332 Therefore, the court held that the
"gowned vehicle" exclusion is unenforceable in the context of underinsured motorist coverage.333
The court determined that section 143-2(5) was made law because the legislature thought, in the absence of universally
mandatory automobile liability insurance, underinsured coverage
was coverage that should be provided to all insured motorists. a34
The court concluded based on the definition of "underinsured motorist" in the insurance code,335 that underinsured motorist coverage "protects the insured [driver] against the risk of a lesser
recovery if injured by an insured driver rather than by an uninsured driver. ' 336 The "owned vehicle" exclusion, as applied to underinsured motorist coverage, would deny coverage that would
otherwise be available had the insured been involved in a collision
with an uninsured motorist. Therefore, the "owned vehicle" exclusion is in conflict with the intent of section 155a-2(5).337 In reaching this decision, the Hettenhausen court has expanded the
application of the Illinois Supreme
Court's ruling in Squire v.
338
Economy Fire & Casualty Co.
D. Subrogation
The Appellate Court for the Fourth District determined
330. Hettenhausen, 154 Il. App. 3d at 492, 507 N.E.2d at 123.
331. Id. at 492-93, 507 N.E.2d at 123-25.
332. Id. at 493, 507 N.E.2d at 125.
333. Id. at 492-93, 507 N.E.2d at 124-25.
334. Id. at 493, 507 N.E.2d at 124.
335. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(3) (1985). "Underinsured motor vehicle"
is defined as a vehicle:
whose ownership, maintenance or use has resulted in bodily injury or death of
the insured . . . and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all ...
policies.. . applicable to the driver or to the person... legally responsible for
such vehicle ... is less than the limits for underinsured coverage provided the
insured....

Id.
336. Hettenhausen, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 493, 507 N.E.2d at 125 (citing Price v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 I11.App. 3d 463, 452 N.E.2d 49 (1st Dist. 1983)).
337. Hettenhausen, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 492, 507 N.E.2d at 125.
338. For the Squire ruling, see supra note 329.
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whether, when an insurer has paid uninsured motorist benefits to
its insured before a court renders a judgment against the uninsured
motorist, the insurer may undertake an indemnification or contribution action directly against a potential insurer of the uninsured
motorist. In Pekin v. CincinnatiInsurance Co.,339 the court held an
insurer could not seek indemnification or contribution in these
circumstances. 3'
In the underlying action, Pekin's insured suffered an injury while

riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by another. 34 ' The
driver had taken the car from his mother without her permis-

sion.14 2 Consequently, when the passenger brought suit against the
driver, Cincinnati Insurance Company ("Cincinnati"), the
mother's insurer, defended under a reservation of rights. 343 At the
time, Pekin advanced fifty thousand dollars to its insured under the
uninsured motorist portion of the policy and sought reimburse-

ment from Cincinnati. 3" Cincinnati countered with a declaratory
action against Pekin to resolve the coverage issue.34 5 Subsequently,
Pekin's insured voluntarily dismissed the suit against the driver.
Cincinnati then voluntarily dismissed its action for declaratory

judgment. 4 6 In response to these events, Pekin sought a declaratory judgment requiring Cincinnati to reimburse Pekin for the fifty
thousand dollars in uninsured motorist benefits which it paid its
insured.347 The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a
cause of action.348
Despite Pekin's arguments that its complaint stated facts that
showed a contribution action existed, the court determined that
Pekin's action was one for indemnification.34 9 The court reached

339. 157 Ill. App. 3d 404, 510 N.E.2d 524 (4th Dist. 1987).
340. Id. at 406-07, 510 N.E.2d at 526.
341. Id. at 405, 510 N.E.2d at 525.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 405-06, 510 N.E.2d at 525.
347. Id. at 406, 510 N.E.2d at 526.
348. Id. at 405, 510 N.E.2d at 525.
349. Id. at 406, 510 N.E.2d at 526. The court stated that assuming Pekin's action
were a contribution action, it would still fail to state a claim. The court noted that contribution actions require an identity between the policies as applied to the parties and also
an identity between the insurable interests and risks. The court determined there was no
identity of policies, insurable interest, or risk. In reaching this determination, the court
stated that Pekin insured the passenger against uninsured motorists while Cincinnati insured the driver's mother against liability arising from traffic accidents. These differences, the court concluded, would cause Pekin's action to fail if it were a contribution
action. Id. at 407, 510 N.E.2d at 526-27.
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this determination because Pekin sought reimbursement of the full
fifty thousand dollars it had paid to its insured and because Pekin's
complaint did not mention contribution.3 5 0 The court then noted
that, as an action for indemnification, Pekin sought the same thing
from Cincinnati that it could have recovered if it had sued the
driver of the automobile directly. 5 ' Such a suit, the court determined, is a direct action against an insurance company for the negligence of its insured before a judgment determining the insured's
liability. 2 As such, the suit is not actionable for public policy
reasons.

353

VII.

LEGISLATION

As a result of the liability insurance crisis,35 4 the legislature
passed, and the governor signed into law on September 26, 1986,355
Senate Bill 1200 ("the Act"). 356 Commonly referred to as the
"Tort Reform Act, ' 357 this legislation contained extensive provisions regarding insurance. 35 Among these provisions, Article 10
added section 143.17a 359 to the insurance code.
Section 143.17a provides that commercial property and casualty
insurers must comply with notice requirements when renewing and
350. Id. at 406, 510 N.E.2d at 526.
351. Id. at 407, 510 N.E.2d at 526.
352. Id.
353. Id. (citing Richardson v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 109 Ill.
2d 41, 47, 485
N.E.2d 327, 331 (1985); Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill.
2d 327, 332-34, 239 N.E.2d
799, 801 (1968) (the legislature has expressed a policy prohibiting direct actions against
insurers before judgment because: (1) only a small minority of states have enacted legislation authorizing direct actions; (2) the Illinois legislature has not enacted a general, statutory authorization of direct actions; and (3) the legislature has enacted a limited
authorization of direct actions against insolvent insurers)). See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
para. 1000 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
354. See P.A. 84-1431, 1986 11. Legis. Serv. 270 (West).
355. Id. at 356.
356. Id. at 270.
357. For an analysis of the tort provisions in the Act, see generally Pope & Freveletti,
Tort Reform Act, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 LOY. U. CHL. L.J. 839 (1986).
358. See P.A. 84-1431, 1986 11. Leg. Serv. 270 (West). Aside from the "tort reform,"
the Act contained provisions regarding: reporting of claim and financial data by property
and casualty insurers (Article 8); restrictions upon property and casualty insurers' ability
to terminate entire lines of insurance in Illinois (Article 9); termination of commercial
property and casualty insurance policies (Article 10); prohibitions against redlining for
commercial property and casualty insurance (Article 12); authorization for banks to form
risk retention groups (Article 14); a municipal insurance availability program (Article
17); authorization for condominium associations to form risk pooling trusts; and insurance cost containment powers and duties for the director of insurance (Article 25). All of
these provisions were effective as of November 25, 1986. Article 10 was effective on
January 24, 1987. Id.
359. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755.17a (Supp. 1986).
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nonrenewing before policy termination. 316 Regarding nonrenewal,
the insurer must provide written notice of nonrenewal to the insured at least sixty days prior to the termination date of the policy. 3 6 ' The insurer must also provide a copy of the notice to the
362
insured's broker, agent, and named lienholder or mortgagee.
The insurer may provide notice of nonrenewal with as little as ten
days advance notice in the event the insured fails to pay its premium. 363 The insurer must also provide the insured specific reasons for the nonrenewal. 364 Finally, the insurer must provide the
insured at least sixty days advance notice when either the renewal
premium increase equals or exceeds thirty percent, deductibles are
materially changed, or coverage is materially changed.365
In either event, if the insurer fails to provide proper notice,366
covIf
erage shall not terminate except under specific circumstances.
the required notice is provided within at least thirty-one days, but
less than sixty days prior to the policy expiration date, the policy
shall be extended for sixty days. 367 If the required notice is not
provided until less than thirty-one days prior to the policy expiration date, the policy shall be extended for a period of one year.368
In no event shall renewal of a commercial property and casualty
policy waive or estop an insurer from cancelling policies 369
for condipolicy.
the
of
date
renewa'
the
before
existed
that
tions
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, commercial insureds
had no statutory protection from sudden notices of nonrenewal or
increases in renewal premium. As a result, the Act provides commercial insureds a measure of protection from sudden and potentially catastrophic lapses in insurance coverage. Nonetheless, the
notice provisions of the Act are so complicated they are certain to
give rise to cancellation disputes and litigation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, the Illinois supreme and appellate
courts addressed several insurance law issues. The resolution of an
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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insurer's duty to defend upon exhaustion of indemnity limits
stands out as the most significant. Nonetheless, the courts also
took substantial steps in the areas of exclusions in contribution actions, defining "insurance," affirming the importance of compliance with contractual time limitations, and determining the extent
of an insured's right to recover its deductible under auto collision
coverage. Moreover, the courts continued to refine the law as applied to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

